Two‐Step Authentication in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks by Komninos, N. et al.
Komninos, N., Vergados, D. D. & Douligeris, C. Two Step Authentication in Mobile Ad Hoc‐  
Networks. Paper presented at the Global Mobile Congress, 11-16 Oct 2006, Beijing, China. 
City Research Online
Original citation: Komninos, N., Vergados, D. D. & Douligeris, C. Two Step Authentication in ‐
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. Paper presented at the Global Mobile Congress, 11-16 Oct 2006, Beijing, 
China. 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/15300/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
   
Abstract— The lack of fixed infrastructure in ad hoc networks 
causes nodes to rely more heavily on peer nodes for 
communication. Nevertheless, establishing trust in such a 
distributed environment is very difficult, since it is not 
straightforward for a node to determine if its peer nodes can be 
trusted. An additional concern in such an environment is with 
whether a peer node is merely relaying a message or if it is the 
originator of the message. In this paper, we propose an 
authentication approach for protecting nodes in mobile ad hoc 
networks. The security requirements for protecting data link and 
network layers are identified and the design criteria for creating 
secure ad hoc networks using several authentication protocols 
are analyzed. Protocols  based on zero knowledge and challenge 
response techniques are presented and their performance is 
evaluated through analysis and simulation. 
 
 
Index Terms— Authentication steps, link and network 
layers, ad hoc networks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
D hoc networks are composed of nodes that do not 
depend on a fixed infrastructure. These networks are 
often wireless with mobile nodes. Examples of ad hoc 
networks can be found in a range of environments, such as 
military battlefields, emergency missions, sensor networks, 
and even virtual classrooms. These networks all require a 
certain level of security that is network function dependent [7, 
8]. For example, a military network might be concerned about 
sensitive intelligence that could affect lives or an entire 
operation, while a transportation sensor network may be 
concerned only with the possible disclosure of proprietary 
data. 
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Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) [8] face many 
challenges. Aside from the many forms of protocol attacks 
that menace a fixed wired network, wireless nodes may also 
be easier to compromise physically. In addition, ad hoc 
networks can be highly dynamic since wireless nodes are free 
to move around. Furthermore, wireless nodes have limited 
battery life and computational power to cope with these 
challenges. To compound these problems, the lack of a fixed 
infrastructure in ad hoc networks causes nodes to rely more 
heavily on peer nodes, even though establishing trust in such a 
distributed environment is very difficult [5, 8, 27]. 
The criteria for protecting ad hoc networks encompass both 
physical entity security and data security (authentication, 
integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation). Availability is 
another very significant concern. For example, a robust 
network should not lose connectivity when a small number of 
nodes leave the network or become unresponsive. Access 
control must also be considered to prevent unauthorized 
access.  
In this paper, the authentication aspect of ad hoc network 
security is addressed. A particularly difficult problem in 
wireless communication is peer identification. The invisible 
node attack and the less threatening wormhole attacks 
leverage the fact that it is very difficult for a receiving node to 
determine if the received message was originated, or was 
relayed without change, from a neighbor [16]. This fact 
greatly complicates peer identification. 
In this article, we first identify the main security issues and 
the most prominent attacks in MANET and then we examine 
the adoption of cryptographic protocols in the data link and 
network layers. A two-step authentication approach is 
proposed to implement multiple lines of defense against 
malicious attacks. This procedure is evaluated and the most 
promising protocols for such an environment are identified. 
This paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, 
Section 2 discusses the security challenges and attack types 
that exist in ad hoc networks. It also presents the security 
mechanisms implemented at the link and network layer with 
respect to the requirements of MANET. Section 3 presents 
current works in the authentication research area.  Section 4 
describes the two-step authentication procedure and discusses 
how challenge-response and zero knowledge cryptographic 
protocols can be applied. Section 4 presents a timing analysis 
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 of some zero knowledge and challenge response protocols to 
compare the execution time for one-hop two-step 
authentication. Section 5 concludes with remarks and 
comments on the unexplored security areas for MANET.  
 
II. SECURITY ISSUES IN THE OPERATIONAL LAYERS OF 
MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS 
The vulnerability of the wireless links in a mobile ad hoc 
environment, the limited physical protection of each of the 
nodes, the sporadic nature of connectivity, the dynamically 
changing topology, the absence of a certification authority, 
and the lack of a centralized monitoring or management point 
make data authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality, and, 
thus, security,  difficult to achieve [7].  
The main requirement for data link layer security 
mechanisms is the need to cope with the lack of physical 
security on the wireless segments of the communication 
infrastructure. The data link layer is then completely justified 
as a means of building a ‘wired equivalent’ security as stated 
by the objectives of the Wireless Equivalent Privacy protocol 
(WEP) of 802.11. If one want to study the security of the data 
link layer with respect to the requirements of MANET, it is 
essential to distinguish the associated environment of 
operation. Two different environments can be identified which 
in turn identify the security mechanisms that can be 
potentially deployed: 802.11 or Bluetooth networks [19] and 
mobile ad hoc networks. 
Data link layer mechanisms like the ones provided by 
802.11 and Bluetooth basically serve for access control and 
privacy enhancements to cope with the vulnerabilities of radio 
communication links. However, data link security performed 
at each hop cannot meet the end-to-end security requirements 
of applications either where 802.11 or Bluetooth protects 
wireless links or on physically-protected wired links.  
Several types of cryptographic attacks due to the misuse of 
the cryptographic primitives exploit inherent vulnerabilities in 
WEP. The 802.11 protocol is vulnerable to DoS attacks where 
the adversary may exploit its binary exponential back-off 
scheme to deny access to the wireless channel from its local 
neighbors. In addition, a continuously transmitting node can 
always capture the channel and cause other nodes to back off 
endlessly, a situation which can trigger a chain reaction from 
upper layer protocols (e.g. TCP window management) [3, 18]. 
Another DoS attack in 802.11 exploits the network 
allocation vector (NAV) field, which indicates channel 
reservation, carried in the Request to Send/Clear (RTS/CTS) 
frames. The adversary may overhear the NAV information 
and then intentionally introduce a 1-bit error into the victim’s 
link layer frame by wireless interference [3, 18].  
In the case of mobile ad hoc networks, there are trusted and 
non-trusted environments. In the trusted environment, the 
nodes of the ad hoc network are controlled by a third party 
and can thus be trusted based on authentication. Data link 
layer security is justified in this case by the need to establish a 
trusted infrastructure based on logical security means. If the 
integrity of higher layer functions implemented by the trusted 
nodes can be assured, then data link layer security can meet 
the security requirements raised by higher layers including 
routing and application protocols [2, 5, 8, 15, 27].  
In non-trusted environments, on the other hand, trust in 
higher layers, like routing or application protocols, cannot be 
based on data link layer security mechanisms. The only 
relevant use of the latter appears to be node-to-node 
authentication and data integrity as required by the routing 
layer. Moreover, the main constraint in the deployment of 
existing data link layer security solutions (i.e. 802.11 and 
Bluetooth) is the lack of support for automated key 
management which is mandatory in open environments where 
manual key installation is not suitable.  
Nevertheless, regardless of the type of environment, the 
main operations of each layer should be investigated for its 
protection. Since the main link layer operations are one-hop 
connectivity and frame transmission [20], link layer security 
protocols should provide peer-to-peer security between 
directly connected nodes and secure frame transmissions by 
automating critical security operations including node 
authentication, frame encryption, data integrity verification 
and node availability.  
The main network operations related to ad hoc networking 
are routing and data packet forwarding [4, 9]. The routing 
protocols exchange routing data between nodes and maintain 
routing states at each node accordingly. Based on the routing 
states, data packets are forwarded by intermediate nodes along 
an established route to the destination.  
In attacks related to routing protocols, the attackers can 
extract traffic towards certain destinations in compromised 
nodes, and forward packets along a route that is not optimal. 
The adversaries can also create routing loops in the network 
and introduce network congestion and channel contention in 
certain areas. There exist several active research efforts in 
identifying and defending more sophisticated routing attacks 
[12, 26, 29, 30]. 
In addition to routing attacks, the adversary may launch 
attacks against packet forwarding operations. Such attacks 
cause the data packets to be delivered in a way that is 
inconsistent with the routing states. For example, the attacker 
may drop the packets along an established route, modify the 
content of the packets, or duplicate the packets it has already 
forwarded [14]. DoS is another type of attack that targets 
packet-forwarding protocols and introduces wireless channel 
contention and network contention in ad hoc networks [5, 8, 
27]. 
Current efforts towards the design of secure routing 
protocols are mainly focused on reactive routing protocols, 
such as in the dynamic source routing (DSR) or in the ad-hoc 
on demand distance vector (AODV) protocols [7, 24]. It has 
been shown that reactive routing protocols perform better with 
significantly lower overheads than proactive protocols since 
they are able to react quickly to topology changes while 
keeping routing overhead low in periods or areas of the 
network in which changes are less frequent. Some of these 
protocols are briefly described in the next few paragraphs.  
  Current secure routing protocols proposed in the literature 
take into consideration active attacks performed by 
compromised nodes that aim at tampering with the execution 
of routing protocols, whereas passive attacks and the 
 selfishness problems are not addressed. For example, the SRP 
[4, 9], which is a reactive protocol, guarantees the acquisition 
of correct topological information. It uses a hybrid key 
distribution based on the public keys of the communicating 
parties. It suffers, however, from the lack of a validation 
mechanism for route maintenance messages [15, 25].    
Another reactive secure ad hoc routing protocol ARIADNE 
[9, 29], which is based on [7], guarantees point-to-point 
authentication using a keyed message authentication code 
(MAC). The ARAN [9] secure routing protocol detects and 
protects against malicious actions carried out by third parties 
and peers in the ad hoc environment. It protects against 
exploits using modification, fabrication and impersonation but 
the use of asymmetric cryptography makes it a very costly 
protocol to use in terms of CPU and energy usage.  
SEAD [30], on the other hand, is a proactive protocol based 
on the destination sequenced distance vector protocol that 
deals with attackers who modify routing information. It makes 
use of efficient one-way hash functions rather than relying on 
expensive asymmetric cryptography operations. SEAD does 
not cope with the wormhole attack and the authors propose, as 
in the ARIADNE protocol, to use a different protocol to detect 
the threat [9, 30].      
III. RELATED WORK 
Authentication has been explored less than routing 
protocols, despite the fact that several authentication 
mechanisms for ad-hoc wireless networks have already been 
proposed. Zhou and Hass [16] identified the vulnerability of 
using a centralized certification authority (CA) for 
authentication in ad-hoc networks and proposed a method 
with multiple CAs based on Threshold Cryptography [2]. 
These multiple CAs have secret shares of a Certificate 
Authority Signing Key (CASK) while there are no CAs that 
individually know the whole complete CASK. The multiple 
CASK can be known only when more than a certain number 
of m CAs collaborate. Therefore, this method can support 
network security against up to m−1 collaborative 
compromised nodes. While Zhou and Hass’s method 
improves the robustness of the authentication system, it 
depends on the offline authority which elects n CAs (n ≥ m) 
during the bootstrapping phase. Furthermore, it has poor 
availability because if n−m+1 CAs have been compromised, 
the uncompromised m−1 CAs that are left can not provide 
authentication services anymore. 
Kong et al. [14] proposed another authentication method 
based on threshold secret sharing [16]. After the bootstrapping 
phase, a new node can join the network at any time and 
through self-initialization it can obtain its own secret share of 
CASK with the help of m local neighbor nodes. Even though 
this approach enhances scalability and availability, it still 
depends on an offline authority during the bootstrapping 
phase. Capkun et al. [25] proposed an authentication method 
and asserted that mobility helps the security. The key idea is 
that if two nodes are in the vicinity of each other, they can 
establish a security association (SA) by exchanging 
appropriate cryptographic material through a secure channel 
with a short transmission range. However, this direct solution 
takes a long time because it requires a node to encounter every 
node that it wants to communicate with. 
Some of the proposals related to the authenticity of ad-hoc 
networks are based on anonymity schemes. ANODR [14] is 
based on an on-demand with identity free routing protocol 
using a symmetric cryptography with a ‘trapdoor boomerang 
onion’ (TBO) approach, similar to the onion routing protocol 
used by Chaum in [9]. The trapdoor mechanism consists of 
sending cryptographically secured messages which may be 
opened only by the intended party. In [10] the low 
performance of the protocol in highly mobile networks was 
pointed out.  
In the MASK [27] protocol both a proactive and a reactive 
approach are applied simultaneously. A priori anonymous 
links are established with all neighboring nodes using a 
symmetric cryptography and a trusted authority. The path 
discovery process is conducted in an on-demand manner. 
Mutually authenticated nodes participate in the end-to-end 
communication. Already established paths may consist of 
several multipath channels. Nevertheless, the source and 
destination nodes become unauthenticated. In SDAR [1] the 
communication between the source and the destination is 
based on a public key cryptography. Additionally, the 
destination node shares a symmetric session key with each 
intermediate node and uses them to secure the discovery path 
process. This protocol takes advantage of both onion and on 
demand routing. Messages in SDAR are large and strongly 
depend on the number of hops. Nevertheless, SDAR is the 
first anonymous protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks that 
introduces a trust management system. However, this system 
supports only three levels of permissible reputation limiting 
therefore its efficiency. 
IV. TWO-STEP AUTHENTICATION 
The existing proposals in ad hoc networks are typically 
attack-oriented since they first identify several security threats 
and then they enhance the existing protocol or propose a new 
protocol to challenge such threats. Because the solutions are 
designed explicitly with certain attack models in mind, they 
work well in the presence of designated attacks but may 
collapse under newborn attacks.  
As mentioned in section 2, link layer operations involve 
one-hop connectivity and frame transmission, whereas 
network layer operations include routing and data packet 
forwarding. These operations comprise of the link and the 
network security mechanisms that can integrate a two-step 
authentication procedure consisting of two steps. The 
operations of either link or network layer can enable one of 
the two steps to take place. In step-one, for example, the node 
authentication procedure attempts to determine the true 
identity of the communicating nodes through a non-interactive 
zero knowledge protocol. Likewise, in step-two the 
authentication procedure seeks again the identities of the 
communicating nodes through a challenge-response protocol.  
It is essential to mention that there are several 
authentication protocols available in the literature that can be 
applied to MANET. However, it is necessary to use non-
interactive and low complexity protocols that will not create 
 extra computational overhead in the network. For example, a 
provably secure authentication scheme can be considered as a 
“good” candidate at the first step. Such a scheme is preferable 
to a computationally secure authentication scheme because its 
security relies on the apparent intractability of a well known 
computational problem (i.e. discrete logarithm problem) and 
does not necessarily require the use of a symmetric or an 
asymmetric encryption algorithm at this early stage [1, 4]. 
Therefore, authentication can be achieved with a zero 
knowledge protocol, similar to the one proposed in [16], that 
provides such characteristics.    
The basic idea behind the operation of such cryptographic 
protocols is that they allow a claimant, a node in MANET 
context, to demonstrate knowledge of a secret while revealing 
no information whatsoever of use to the verifying node even if 
the claimant node misbehaves in the protocol. In such 
protocols, nodes must exchange multiple messages, also 
referred to as interactive. The proof is probabilistic rather than 
absolute. However, interactive zero protocols are not suitable 
for wireless environments since they exchange multiple 
messages and result in the reduction of network performance. 
MANET are suitable for non-interactive zero knowledge 
protocols where nodes do not need to exchange multiple 
messages to prove their identity. 
In the second step of the authentication, node authentication 
is essential before routing information is ready to be sent. A 
computationally secure authentication scheme is preferable 
than a provably secure authentication scheme because it 
requires the use of a symmetric or an asymmetric key 
encryption algorithm. It is necessary to use an encryption 
algorithm to authenticate nodes since it is the last procedure 
before information is exchanged between communicating 
nodes. Thus, the security in two-step authentication will not 
rely only on the apparent intractability of a single 
computational problem. A challenge-response protocol can be 
chosen where users and nodes can prove their identities by 
demonstrating knowledge of a shared secret known to be 
associated with them. 
1. First Step 
The two-step authentication design adopts cryptographic 
methods to offer multiple protection lines to communicating 
nodes. When one or more nodes are connected to a MANET, 
the first step of node-to-node authentication procedure takes 
place. At this early stage, it is necessary to be able to 
determine the true identity of the nodes which could possibly 
gain access to a secret key later on. Let us consider the 
MANET of Figure 1 with the authenticated nodes A, B, and 
C. 
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Figure 1 – Authentication of New Nodes in MANET 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1a, when node X1 enters the 
MANET, it will be authenticated by both nodes that will 
exchange routing information later on in the second step (i.e. 
B and C). When two nodes e.g. X1 and X2 enter the MANET 
simultaneously (Figure 1b), they will both be authenticated by 
valid nodes. Even though we refer to nodes entering 
simultaneously there will always be a small time difference in 
their entrance to the network. When X1 enters slightly before 
X2, then X1 gets authenticated first by nodes B and C, making 
X1 a valid node and next X2 gets authenticated by nodes B 
and X1. 
When two or more nodes are simultaneously connected to a 
MANET (e.g. Figure 1b) there will still be a fraction of time 
that X1, for example, will enter the network first and will be 
authenticated. Once X1 and X2 have been authenticated by 
valid nodes, they will also authenticate each other since 
routing and packet forwarding data will be sent to or received 
by them.  
In Figure 1a for example, a provably secure scheme can be 
applied.  X1 proves its identity to B and C by ensuring that the 
discrete logarithms, y1 = a1x1 and y2 = a2x2, to the bases a1, a2, 
satisfy the linear Equation 1: 
 
k1 ⋅ x1 + k2 ⋅ x2 = b (mod p) (1) 
 
for integers k1, k2 and prime number p [19]. 
In the protocol, X1 first computes y3 = a3x3 and y4 = a4x4 and 
then solves Equation 2, for integers x3, x4: 
 
                    k1 ⋅ x3 + k2 ⋅ x4 = 0 (mod p) (2) 
 
Then, as shown below: 
 
B,C ← X1: y5 = a1x3, y6 = a2x4                (M1) 
B,C → X1: H(a1, a2, y1, y2, k1, k2, b, y5, y6) = y7         (M2) 
B,C ← X1: y8=x3 - y7 · x1 (mod p), y9 = x4 - y7 · x2 (mod p) (M3) 
 
X1 sends y5 and y6 to B and C. Upon reception of message 
(M1), B and C compute y7 with a one way hash function and 
send message (M2) to X1. Next, X1 checks the validity of 
(M1), constructs message (M3) and sends y8 and y9 to B and 
C.  
 
 X1 convinces B and C that he/she knows the discrete 
algorithms of y1 and y2 to the bases a1 and a2, respectively, 
and that these logarithms satisfy a linear equation. This can be 
done by verifying the resulting proof (y7, y8, y9). It can be 
easily seen that B and C will always succeed in constructing a 
valid proof by first reconstructing y10 = a1y8 ⋅ y1y4,                    
y11 = a2y9 ⋅ y2y7, and then checking whether y7 is equal to y12, 
for H(a1, a2, y1, y2, k1, k2, b, y10, y11) = y12, and whether 
Equation 3 is valid: 
  
                k1 ⋅ y8 + k2 ⋅ y9 = - y7 ·b (mod p) (3) 
 
First, it can be easily seen that B and C will always succeed 
in constructing a valid proof since y10 = y5 and   y11 = y6, 
where: 
  
y10 = a1y8 ⋅ y1y7 = a1x3 - y7 · x1 ⋅ a1x1 ·  y7 = a1x3 = y5  
y11 = a2y9 ⋅ y2y7 = a2x4 - y7 · x2 ⋅ a2x2 ·  y7 = a2x4 = y6. 
 
Thus,  
 
y12 = H(a1, a2, y1, y2, k1, k2, b, y10, y11) =                                 
H(a1, a2, y1, y2, k1, k2, b, y5, y6) = y7 
 
Hence, B and C calculate y12 and compare it with y7 in 
message (M2).  
Assume that an intruder E, who does not know x1 and x2, 
was able to compute such proofs. Since the one-way hash 
function y7 is hard to invert, we can assume that the values y10 
and y11 were fixed before y7 in message (M2) was computed. 
It also seems necessary that when fixing the values y10 and y11, 
B and C were prepared to compute a proof for many other 
possible messages. But this means that E could also compute 
different representations of y10 and y11 to the bases a1, y1 and 
a2, y2 which implies the knowledge of x1 and x2, the discrete 
logarithms y1, y2 to the bases a1, a2, but this contradicts the 
assumption that the cheating intruder E does not know x1 and 
x2.  
Furthermore, B and C verify whether the response y8 and y9 
satisfies Equation 3. Thus: 
 
k1 ⋅ y8 + k2 ⋅ y9  = k1⋅ (x3 – y7 · x1) + k2⋅ (x4 – y7 · x2) 
  = k1⋅ x3 – k1 · y7 · x1 + k2 ⋅ x4 – k2 ⋅ y7 · x2 
   = k1⋅ x3 + k2 ⋅ x4 – y7 · (k2 · x1 – k2 ⋅  x2) 
  = – y7 · b (mod p) 
 
and the identity of X1 is validated. 
2. Second Step 
When routing information is ready to be transferred, the 
second step of the two-step authentication takes place. 
Authentication carries on in the available nodes starting with 
one-hop distances at a time from the source to destination 
route. While nodes in the source to destination path are 
authenticated, they can also agree on a secret key, which will 
be used to encrypt their traffic.   
Based on the zero knowledge protocol of section 3.1, 
integers x1 and x2 are known to all nodes and can be used here 
as a shared secret key. Hence, when symmetric techniques are 
applied mutual authentication between B and X1 (see Figure 
1a) can be achieved based on ISO/IEC 9798-2: 
B ← X1 : r1                               (M1) 
B → X1 : Ex1 (r1, r2, B) (M2) 
B ← X1 : Ex2 (r2, r1)  (M3) 
 
where E is a symmetric encryption algorithm and r1, r2 are 
random numbers.   
Node X1 generates a random number and sends this 
number to B.  Upon reception of (M1), B encrypts the two 
random numbers and its identity and sends message (M2) to 
X1.  Then, X1 checks for its random number, constructs (M3) 
and sends it to B.  Upon reception of (M3), B checks that both 
random numbers match those used earlier. The encryption 
algorithm in the above mechanism may be replaced by MAC, 
which is efficient and affordable for low-end devices, such as 
sensor nodes. However, MAC can be verified only by the 
intended receiving node, making it ineligible for broadcast 
message authentication.  
On the other hand, when asymmetric key techniques are 
applied, nodes own a key pair and the mutual authentication 
between X1 and C (Figure 1a) can be achieved by using the 
modified Needham-Schoeder public key protocol [1] in the 
following way: 
 
X1 → C : Pc (r1, X1)  (M1) 
X1 ← C : PX1 (r1, r2)  (M2) 
X1 → C : r2     (M3) 
 
where P is a public key encryption algorithm and r1, r2 are 
random numbers.   
X1 and C exchange random numbers in messages (M1) and 
(M2) that are encrypted with their public keys. Upon 
decrypting messages (M1) and (M2), C and X1 achieve 
mutual authentication by checking that the random numbers 
recovered agree with the ones sent in messages (M3) and 
(M2) respectively. Note that the public key encryption 
algorithm can be replaced by an elliptic curve cryptosystem 
(ECC) or by digital signatures. Digital signatures, however, 
involve a higher computational overhead in signing, 
decrypting, verifying and encrypting operations. They are also 
less resilient against DoS attacks since an attacker may launch 
a large number of bogus signatures to exhaust the victim’s 
computational resources as the user tries to verify these 
signatures. Each node also needs to keep a certificate 
revocation list or the revoked certificates and public keys of 
valid nodes. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS   
The two-step authentication solution poses grand yet 
exciting research challenges. Since a mobile communication 
system expects a best effort performance from each 
component, MANET have to properly select authentication 
mechanisms for their nodes that fit well into their own 
 available resources. It is necessary to identify the systems’ 
principles of how to build such link and network security 
mechanisms that will explore their methods and learn to 
prevent and react to threats accordingly. 
The analysis presented in this section compares the 
execution time of well known authentication protocols to 
achieve two-step authentication. The described protocols in 
sections 4.1 and 4.2 were simulated following the MANET 
infrastructure of Figure 1a. We have considered the simplest 
MANET structure where a newly -entering mobile node is 
authenticated by only two neighbouring nodes. Additional 
tests were carried out for mobile nodes that have three and 
four neighbouring nodes. The results depended on the number 
of neighbouring nodes in a proportional way and, thus, they 
are not presented in this paper.  
The zero knowledge and challenge-response authentication 
protocols were simulated in the OPNET Modeler / Wireless 
network simulator, whereas the encryption algorithms were 
implemented in a digital signal processor (DSP). The testbed 
consisted of an IBM compatible personal computer (PC), in 
which OPNET was installed, and two parallel 36303 Motorola 
DSPs (66MHz), in which the encryption and the decryption 
were performed. The PC and the DSPs communicated through 
a parallel port. 
The OPNET Modeler / Wireless suite has a large set of 
standard communication protocols, along with number of 
models for simulating the wireless channel. Individual 
components are updated and interchanged, allowing us to 
select mobility, application and channel models that are 
appropriate for any given MANET scenario. Moreover, the 
proposed protocols can be easily  replaced with models of 
traditional protocols, allowing us to easily perform 
comparative simulation analyses.  
Symmetric, asymmetric and elliptic curve cryptosystems 
were implemented to offer a complete analysis of the 
authentication protocols that were described in section 3.2. As 
a symmetric key algorithm, the advanced encryption standard 
(AES) cryptosystem was applied; as an asymmetric key 
algorithm the Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem 
was implemented; and as an elliptic curve the Menezes-
Vanstone cryptosystem [2] was deployed. The key size was 
based on the X9.30 standard specifications.  
 
Cryptographic 
Algorithms 
Key  
Length 
Encryptio
n (500-bit) 
Decrypti
on 
(500-bit) 
AES 128-bit  20ms 23ms 
RSA (with CRT) 2048-bit 50ms 120ms  
ECC Menezes-
Vanstone 
224-bit 72ms 68ms 
 
Table 1 – Timing Analysis of Encryption Algorithms for Specific Key Size 
 
As illustrated in Table 1 and as specified in the current draft 
of the revision of X9.30, for reasonable secure 128-bit key of 
AES, 2048-bit and 224-bit are the “appropriate” key sizes for 
RSA when the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is used 
and for ECC, respectively [2, 31, 32]. The processing times 
presented in Table 1 are computed in the DSPs. Note that the 
AES key setup routine is slower for decryption than for 
encryption; for RSA encryption, we assume the use of a 
public exponent e = 65537, while ECC uses an optimal 
normal base curve [2, 5]. The processing times are related 
only to the second phase of the authentication procedure, 
where an encryption algorithm is applied in ISO/IEC 9798-2 
protocol. 
 
 
Table 2 – Timing Analysis of two-step Node Authentication 
 
Table 2 shows the time required for a node to be 
authenticated, when a combination of cryptographic protocols 
is used in the first and second phase. For example, when a 
node enters a MANET, it can be authenticated by a zero 
knowledge protocol similar to the one presented in section 
3.1. It is not recommended, however, for nodes to follow 
exactly the same authentication procedure in phase two when 
the routing information is ready to be transferred, because the 
authentication procedure that is successful once is most likely 
to succeed again without providing a significant increase in 
security.  
Notice that when exactly the same authentication procedure 
is deployed twice in phase one and phase two, the total 
execution time is faster (i.e. 2xZK=42.82ms, 
2xAES=96.44ms, 2xRSA=340.28ms and 2xECC=290.34ms) 
Two-Step 
Authentication 
First 
Step 
Second 
Step 
Total Remarks 
2 x Zero 
Knowledge 
(ZK) 
(Section 3.1) 
(ZK) 
21.41 ± 
2ms 
(ZK) 
21.41 ± 
2ms  
42.82 
± 5ms 
NR 
2 x ISO/IEC 
9798-2 (AES) 
(Section 3.2) 
(9798-2-
AES) 
43.22 ± 
2ms 
(9798-2-
AES) 
43.22 ± 
2ms 
96.44 
± 5ms 
NR 
2 x Needham-
Schroeder  
(NS-RSA) 
(Section 3.2) 
(NS-
RSA) 
170.14 ± 
2ms 
(NS-
RSA) 
170.14 ± 
3ms 
340.2
8 ± 
5ms 
NR 
2 x Needham-
Schroeder  
(NS-ECC) 
(Section 3.2) 
(NS-
ECC) 
145.17 ± 
3ms 
(NS-
ECC) 
145.17 ± 
2ms 
290.3
4 ± 
5ms 
NR 
ZK & 9798-2-
AES 
(ZK)  
64.63 ± 
2ms 
(9798-2-
AES) 
64.63 ± 
2ms 
129.2
6 ± 
5ms 
R 
ZK & NS-RSA 
(ZK)  
191.55 ± 
2ms 
(NS-
RSA) 
191.55 ± 
2ms 
383.1
0 ± 
5ms 
R 
ZK & NS-ECC 
(ZK)  
166.58 ± 
2ms 
(NS-
ECC) 
166.58 ± 
2ms 
333.1
6 ± 
5ms 
R 
 than the execution time of the combined cryptographic 
techniques (i.e. ZK & AES = 129.26ms, ZK & RSA = 
383.10ms and ZK & ECC = 33.16ms). Considering that the 
authentication procedure that was successful once is most 
likely to succeed again without increasing security, a 
combination of zero knowledge and challenge-response 
authentication techniques appears to be a recommended option 
when link and network layers operations are taking place.  
In such circumstances, the decision of whether to use zero 
knowledge with symmetric or with asymmetric key techniques 
can be determined by the timing analysis. Notice that no 
consideration was given to the physical connection link 
between the DSPs and the PC in the total timing. A different 
implementation will yield to different results. In addition, the 
zero knowledge and challenge-response total execution time 
was considered for one-hop connectivity. In the case of 
broadcast messaging, packets were dropped by the 
neighboring nodes in a table-driven routing protocol without 
affecting the execution time of the authentication procedure. 
Moreover, no timing differences were observed in different 
network loads. 
The purpose of the simulation analysis, which is presented 
in Table 2, is to evaluate multiple authentication fences in 
MANET and offer new application opportunities. The 
effectiveness of each authentication operation and the minimal 
number of fences the system has built to ensure some degree 
of security assurance was evaluated through simulations 
analysis and measurements. 
The results of this section were obtained by specific zero 
knowledge and challenge-response protocols. MANET 
security designers can use these results to determine whether 
to use multiple authentication techniques or not. The timing 
analysis of Table 2 directs security designers to overcome the 
single point of failure in an ad hoc network when two-step 
authentication is implemented. They can also choose which 
combination of zero knowledge and challenge-response 
technique to apply in their particular applications. However, 
we should also take into consideration that the two-step 
authentication procedure adds extra overhead to the network, 
an overhead that must be evaluated vis as vis the specific 
application and the environment the MANET operates in. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The security of MANET has become a considerably more 
sophisticated problem than the problem of security of other 
networks, due to the open nature and lack of infrastructure of 
ad hoc networks. Current research efforts on ad hoc networks 
follow a hierarchical approach, where the most explored area 
involves secure routing protocols. Authentication and key 
management mechanisms, on the other side, are explored less 
than routing protocols, whereas the least explored research 
area relates to link security protocols. 
Since mobile ad hoc networks can be formed, merged 
together or partitioned into separate networks on the fly, 
security becomes more sophisticated. Security requirements, 
such as authenticity should focus on the operations of both 
link and network layers. In this article, we explored the 
security issues of MANET and integrated cryptographic 
mechanisms in the first and second step that helped to design 
multiple lines of defense and further protect ad hoc networks 
against malicious attacks. 
Designing such cryptographic mechanisms as zero 
knowledge and challenge-response protocols, which are 
efficient in the sense of both computational and message 
overhead, is the main research objective in the area of 
authentication and key management for ad hoc networks. For 
instance, in wireless sensing, designing efficient cryptographic 
mechanisms for authentication and key management in 
broadcast and multicast scenarios may pose a challenge. The 
execution time of specific protocols was examined and useful 
results were obtained when multiple lines of defence were 
applied.    
Once the authentication and key management infrastructure 
is in place, data confidentiality and integrity issues can be 
tackled by using existing and efficient symmetric algorithms 
since there is no need to develop any special integrity and 
encryption algorithms for ad hoc networks.    
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